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It has been argued that general anesthetics suppress the level of consciousness, or
the contents of consciousness, or both. The distinction between level and content
is important because, in addition to clarifying the mechanisms of anesthesia, it may
help clarify the neural bases of consciousness. We assess these arguments in the
light of evidence that both the level and the content of consciousness depend upon
the contribution of apical input to the information processing capabilities of neocortical
pyramidal cells which selectively amplify relevant signals. We summarize research
suggesting that what neocortical pyramidal cells transmit information about can be
distinguished from levels of arousal controlled by sub-cortical nuclei and from levels of
prioritization specified by interactions within the thalamocortical system. Put simply, on
the basis of the observations reviewed, we hypothesize that when conscious we have
particular, directly experienced, percepts, thoughts, feelings and intentions, and that
general anesthetics affect consciousness by interfering with the subcellular processes by
which particular activities are selectively amplified when relevant to the current context.
Keywords: general anesthesia, neocortical pyramidal cells, apical amplification, neural correlates of
consciousness, noradrenergic arousal, thalamus
INTRODUCTION: THE ISSUES AND OUR HYPOTHESES
General anesthetics are designed to produce a temporary, reversible and harmless loss of
consciousness. Advances in our understanding of the ways in which general anesthetics affect
mental state may therefore cast light on the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). Stating
the central issue addressed here in this way implies that mental states can be adequately grouped
into those that are conscious and those that are not. Though our presentation will proceed on
that simplifying assumption, the final section notes that there may be reasons to question it.
Furthermore, as consideration of these issues requires the discussion of aspects of conscious
experience and neurobiological activity that are closely related, we take care to keep them
conceptually distinct. We assume that different aspects of consciousness have different neuronal
bases, and that one distinction relevant to both the phenomenology and the neurobiology
is that between content and level. Subjective aspects of conscious phenomenology include
not only the categorical or semantic content that are related to the content-specific NCC in
terms of Koch et al. (2016), but also those aspects that characterize the level of consciousness
(Bachmann, 2012). Koch et al. (2016) subsume neuromodulatory and other level-regulating factors
under the background conditions for being conscious, which are assumed to enable consciousness
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without contributing directly to its semantic content. As
Bachmann and Hudetz (2014) propose, we assume that these
and other modulatory mechanisms affect aspects of subjective
experience that are measurable psychophysically by reference to
attributes such as clarity, salience, vividness and confidence.
We make no attempt to review the many theories of
general anesthesia, but do relate our hypotheses to those
of Mashour and Hudetz (2017). These leading researchers
distinguish three classes of general anesthetic. One class, such
as dexmedetomidine, reduces the ‘‘level’’ of consciousness by
effects on ‘‘bottom-up’’ subcortical mechanisms that regulate
arousal. Another class, such as ketamine, reduces or distorts
the ‘‘contents’’ of consciousness by effects on ‘‘top-down’’
mechanisms that play a major role in specifying semantic
content. The effects of ketamine are thought to be particularly
revealing because they can be seen as primarily reflecting effects
on the contents rather than on the level of consciousness. The
third class, such as propofol, is thought to affect both level and
semantic content, thus having a dual action that makes them
especially useful.
We agree withMashour andHudetz (2017) that: (i) it is useful,
as a first approximation, to assume that conscious states have
both ‘‘level’’ and ‘‘content’’, as suggested previously by others
(e.g., Laureys et al., 1999, 2004); (ii) general anesthetics may
affect either or both; and (iii) this casts light on the neural
bases of consciousness. They argue that the effects of anesthetics
on level and content may be ‘‘intertwined’’ but do not suggest
how. We argue that they are intertwined partly because both
involve modifications of apical function within the neocortical
pyramidal cells whose activity is central to the contents of
consciousness and which are also major targets of signals that
regulate levels of arousal and consciousness. The existence of a
long apical dendrite linking the soma to an apical tuft in layers
1 and 2 of the cortex has been a characteristic of the large
neocortical pyramidal cells since their discovery more than a
100 years ago. One consequence of this is that tuft inputs are
electrotonically distant from the soma. If the apical dendrite
were a passive cable then inputs to tuft synapses would have
little or no effect on the generation of action potentials. The
apical dendrite is studded with voltage-dependent channels that
actively propagate and modify dendritic signals, however, and
this can partly compensate for the distance of tuft synapses
from the soma, thus approximating a ‘‘dendritic democracy’’
(e.g., Magee, 1999). Recent discoveries (e.g., Sherman, 2012;
Larkum, 2013), outlined in more detail below, suggest that
our understanding of these active dendritic mechanisms needs
to be supplemented, with fundamental implications for our
understanding of the neural bases of perception, consciousness,
and the mechanisms of anesthesia. Thus, our article aims to
contribute to the development of the comprehensive systems-
neuroscience approach to anesthesia called for by Mashour and
Hudetz (2017).
In brief, the hypotheses outlined below build upon evidence
that withinmany neocortical pyramidal cells, such as thick-tufted
layer 5 cells, there is an apical integration zone (AIZ) near the
top of their apical dendrite with effects that clearly distinguish
the information processing functions of apical from basal inputs.
We interpret the available evidence as indicating that a common
function of tuft inputs to the AIZ is to amplify or attenuate
responses of pyramidal cells to their basal inputs (e.g., Larkum,
2013; Phillips et al., 2016; Phillips, 2017). Thus, in this mode of
operation, the selective feedforward receptive fields about which
these pyramidal cells reliably transmit information is determined
by their basal inputs. Though there are species differences, a
preserved feature across mammals is that these feedforward
connections avoid layer 1 and terminate most densely in layers
3 and 4, whereas feedback projections are dense in layer 1
(see review by D’Souza and Burkhalter, 2017). We will cite
evidence that inputs to tuft synapses in layer 1 come from
diverse sources and amplify responses to basal inputs when
those responses are relevant to the current activity elsewhere
in the system, as signaled by apical inputs. In relation to the
distinction between level and content discussed by Mashour
and Hudetz (2017), the hypotheses we focus on here imply
a distinction between the general level of neocortical arousal
and levels of prioritization or salience of particular semantic
contents. On this view, the general level of arousal is regulated
by subcortical systems, whereas prioritization depends upon
locally specific interactions within the thalamocortical system.
Our hypotheses are closely related to that of Cauller and Connors
(1992) who argue that general anesthesia is a state in which
the influence of backward projections to the most superficial
cortical layers is suppressed. In support of that view, they
cite evidence that a component of the somatosensory-evoked
cortical potential that is generated by excitation of layers I
and II in awake monkeys and related to their behavior is
selectively abolished during unconscious states of slow-wave
sleep (Cauller and Kulics, 1988) and general anesthesia (Arezzo
et al., 1981). Our hypotheses support and extend the hypothesis
of Cauller and Connors by relating it to much recent evidence
on the function of input to synapses of the apical tuft
and its role in regulating the state of consciousness. ‘‘Apical
Amplification (AA): Selective Amplification of Pyramidal Cell
Outputs by Inputs to Their Apical Dendrites’’ section reviews
evidence that neocortical pyramidal neurons can function in
a mode in which contextual information received via the
apical dendrites amplifies their action potential output when
relevant in the current context. ‘‘Evidence and Arguments
Relating Apical Function to Conscious State’’ section summarizes
several grounds for associating this selective amplification with
conscious state. ‘‘Evidence That General Anesthetics Interfere
With Apical Function’’ section reviews evidence indicating that
all or most general anesthetics operate by interfering with apical
function. Issues that arise from these hypotheses, including their
difficulties and inadequacies, are discussed in the final sections.
APICAL AMPLIFICATION: SELECTIVE
AMPLIFICATION OF PYRAMIDAL CELL
OUTPUTS BY INPUTS TO THEIR APICAL
DENDRITES
This section briefly outlines evidence that the apical dendrites
that receive information from diverse sources, including
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feedback, are critical for context dependent gating of feedforward
inputs via their effects on the AIZ. For more detailed reviews
see (Larkum, 2013) and (Phillips, 2017). Depolarization of
the AIZ, either antidromically or synaptically, can generate
calcium dependent regenerative potentials in the apical dendrite,
sometimes referred to as calcium spikes, though they are
longer lasting than regular sodium spikes (Larkum and Zhu,
2002). Calcium spiking is greatly facilitated by back-propagating
sodium action potentials in an interaction referred to as
back-propagation activated calcium-spike firing (BAC-firing).
BAC-firing can therefore turn a single axonal spike into a
high frequency burst (Larkum et al., 2001; Larkum and Zhu,
2002; Williams and Stuart, 2002) as shown in Figure 1. This
provides a cellular mechanism by which pyramidal cells can
respond more strongly to their basal inputs when that is
amplified by depolarizing synaptic input to their apical synapses
in layer 1 (see reviews by Larkum, 2013; D’Souza and Burkhalter,
2017).
Excitatory inputs to apical synapses in layer 1 are
complemented by inputs from inhibitory interneurons
residing within that layer, as well as from interneurons in
lower layers that project their axons into layer 1, such as the
somatostatin-expressing Martinotti cells (reviewed by Gentet
et al., 2012; Jiang et al., 2015). Because the effects of synaptic
inputs to the AIZ depend upon spiking initiated by basal
input, these effects have been interpreted as mechanisms for
amplifying or attenuating response to the basal input, as shown
in Figure 2 (Phillips et al., 2016). Anatomical evidence also
suggests some such interpretation because it shows that inputs
to apical dendrites come from a diverse range of sources,
including feedback from higher cortical regions, whereas
input to basal dendrites come from a restricted range of
sources such as those that specify receptive field selectivity.
As feedback has often been associated with modulatory
functions in perceptual systems (e.g., Zhang et al., 2014),
this is in broad agreement with our interpretation of the
intracellular evidence as indicating that apical inputs can
function in a mode in which they amplify the cell’s responses
to basal inputs when relevant and attenuate them when
irrelevant.
There are several reasons for assuming that much feedback
from higher cortical regions is not driving, including the simple
observation that if it were then cells lower in the hierarchy of
neocortical abstractions would inherit the large receptive fields
of those projecting to them from higher in the hierarchy, but
this is rarely observed. There are many ways in which inputs
could influence a cell’s output without being driving, however,
and several of these ways could plausibly be referred to as
being modulatory even though their information processing
functions differ greatly from each other (Kay et al., 2017; Kay
and Phillips, 2018). The information processing functions of the
AIZ and the diverse inputs that it receives are therefore not
adequately described by classifying them as ‘‘modulatory’’. For
present purposes suffice it to say that the kind of contextual
modulation likely to be implemented by the AIZ is that required
to interpret ambiguous stimuli in the most probable way,
where the notion of ‘‘ambiguity’’ is interpreted broadly so as
to include ambiguity of presence or task relevance, as well
as ambiguity of categorization. Consider A l3 C, for example.
The context used to disambiguate the central symbol does so
even though that context is neither necessary nor sufficient
to see the central symbol. The input to be disambiguated is
both necessary and sufficient in that even in the absence of
context the ambiguous input is seen if and only if there is
FIGURE 1 | Apical amplification (AA). Evidence from multi-site patch-clamping, and the intracellular processes inferred from such evidence. (A) A layer 5 (L5)
neocortical pyramidal cell with simultaneous patch-clamp recording in the soma (blue), near the middle of the apical dendrite (gray), and near the top of the apical
dendrite. (B) Post-synaptic potentials recorded at the three sites to current injected at the apical integration zone (AIZ) (top), in the soma (middle), or at both (bottom).
The key observation is that AIZ stimulation, which by itself has little or no effect on somatic depolarization, transforms the cell’s response to basal input from one
axonal spike to a 20 ms burst of three spikes, an output that is highly informative because it is rare in spontaneous activity. (C) Inferences concerning dendritic spikes
in neocortical pyramidal neurons. Apical tufts and thus the AIZ of pyramidal neurons receive inputs from diverse sources of contextual information. Calcium currents,
and thus synaptic plasticity, depend on backpropagating action potentials (bAPs, gray), apical dendritic calcium spikes (red) and NMDA spikes (blue). NMDA spikes
require both local depolarization and glutamate (blue dots). (A,B) are from Figure 2 of Larkum (2013) (permission to reuse acknowledged) and (C) is modified from
Figure 1 of Larkum and Phillips (2016) (courtesy of Cambridge University Press).
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FIGURE 2 | Primitive interactions from which neocortical circuits are built (adapted from Phillips et al., 2015, 2016). These generic depictions of neocortical pyramidal
cells distinguish their apical and basal dendrites. The diagrams are not to be interpreted as microcircuits, and no attempt is made to show any columnar
organization. The two cells shown in each section could be in either the same or different columns, or in different cortical regions. Six different ways in which the cell
on the left could affect activity of the cell on the right are shown. Hyperpolarization-activated currents through HCN channels are shown as Ih. They are crucial
because when high, they disconnect the AIZ from the soma. The diagram is intended to indicate that the effects of apical input are more conditional than those of
basal inputs because they require low Ih and the presence of net basal excitation. Inhibitory interneurons are shown as ovals. Cholinergic inputs are shown as ACh.
The adrenergic inputs that reduce Ih are shown as norepinephrine (NE). There are many ways in which these primitives could be combined. For example, the outputs
of a given pyramidal cell could be excitatory at some of its projective sites and amplifying at others, or an inhibitory interneuron could combine disinhibition with
disattenuation by inhibiting interneurons that target the soma as well as those that target the tuft.
something to be seen. The ambiguity of the central symbol in
this particular demonstration can be brought to awareness by
noting that the central symbol in 12 l3 14 is likely to be interpreted
differently, though it is identical to that shown in a different
context. This phenomenological demonstration of contextual
modulation can be related to apical function by assuming that
in the context of other letters activity of the neural population
code interpreting the ambiguous symbol as a letter is amplified,
and that interpreting it as a digit is attenuated. If on first seeing
the ambiguous symbol in the context of letters the reader was
aware of the possibility of it being a number rather than a
letter, then we assume that that awareness had less salience or
clarity than its interpretation as a letter. Recent advances in
information theory have now been used to show that this kind of
contextual modulation is very different from multiplicative and
divisive operations as well as from subtraction, none of which are
plausibly implemented by BAC-firing (Kay et al., 2017; Kay and
Phillips, 2018).
Most of the research on BAC-firing has been on layer
5 cells, but pyramidal cells in both infragranular and
supragranular layers have apical dendrites in layer 1, and,
there is evidence that something similar also occurs in
other cells, such as those in Layer 2/3 of rat somatosensory
(Palmer et al., 2014) and prefrontal cortex (Boudewijns et al.,
2013). These findings suggest that intracellular mechanisms
for the contextual amplification of relevant signals may be
widely distributed throughout the cortex in both infra- and
supra-granular pyramidal cells.
Anatomical evidence clearly indicates that apical inputs
to neocortical pyramidal cells come from a wide variety of
sources. These include direct feedback from higher cortical
regions, indirect feedback via the thalamus, long-range lateral
connections both within and between cortical regions, and
the amygdala (Gur and Snodderly, 2008; Rubio-Garrido et al.,
2009). This wide range contrasts greatly with the narrow
range of sources specifying their selective sensitivity, which
predominantly target basal and perisomatic sites. Though some
inputs to layer 1 do connect to inhibitory interneurons, their
synapses are predominantly depolarizing (Shao and Burkhalter,
1996) and on the apical tufts of pyramidal cells (Budd, 1998).
This is all as expected on the assumption that apical inputs are
predominantly amplifying, rather than driving.
The enhancement of axonal output by apical input is referred
to as AA (e.g., Bachmann, 2015; Phillips et al., 2015; Takahashi
et al., 2016; Phillips, 2017). Reduction of this effect is referred
to as disamplification, or attenuation, which differs from other
forms of inhibition or suppression because, even when strong, it
does not prevent output, but simply reduces amplification of that
output. Evidence for AA comes from many sources including
both in vitro and in vivo cellular physiology (Larkum, 2013;
Frontiers in Neural Circuits | www.frontiersin.org 4 July 2018 | Volume 12 | Article 50
Phillips et al. General Anesthesia and Apical Function
Phillips et al., 2016; Takahashi et al., 2016; Phillips, 2017) and
from macroscopic neuroimaging (Muckli et al., 2015; Petro and
Muckli, 2017).
As indicated in Figure 2, the effects of apical inputs on axonal
spiking are highly dependent on the state of the HCN-channels
that pass hyperpolarization-activated currents (Ih) (for a review
see Biel et al., 2009). They have a high density in the apical tufts
of L5 neocortical pyramidal neurons (e.g., Lörincz et al., 2002).
These non-synaptic cation conductances are tonically active at
rest and act as a leak conductance that tends to isolate the apical
inputs from the soma unless Ih is low. As Figure 2 shows, we
hypothesize that the extent to which apical inputs amplify or
attenuate response to basal inputs is regulated by the adrenergic
system via its effects on Ih. This central hypothesis has now
been directly confirmed by research using two-photon dendritic
Ca2+ imaging and in vivo whole-cell and extracellular recordings
in awake mice (Labarrera et al., 2018). As their research is
independent of ours, the extent to which it provides empirical
support for our hypotheses greatly increases our confidence in
their validity and importance. Thus, adrenergic arousal tends
to increase the extent to which apical inputs influence axonal
output, with crucial implications for apical function and its
potential relevance to the state of consciousness, as discussed in
further detail in the next section.
EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENTS RELATING
APICAL FUNCTION TO CONSCIOUS
STATE
There are a wide variety of grounds on which apical function
can be related closely to conscious state (e.g., Bachmann, 2015;
Phillips et al., 2016), each of which is briefly outlined here. We
do not claim that these grounds are conclusive, either separately
or collectively. Our aim here is to show that apical function can
be associated with conscious state on several different grounds.
Though not conclusive, these grounds are extensive, and
involve anatomy, physiology, psychophysiology, psychophysics,
macroscopic neuroimaging, computational modelling, pathology
and philosophy.
The anatomical grounds are in part that apical synapses are a
major target for the long-range connections that have often been
associated with consciousness. Apical inputs are diverse and
include feedback from regions higher in the neocortical pathway
as well as inputs from higher-order thalamus (for reviews see:
Gur and Snodderly, 2008; Rubio-Garrido et al., 2009; D’Souza
and Burkhalter, 2017). Perceptual awareness of particular stimuli
is thought to be dependent on interactions between feedforward
and feedback signals on several grounds (van Gaal and Lamme,
2012; Pinto et al., 2013). First, conscious processing is associated
with greatly increased recurrent long-range interaction
(e.g., Gaillard et al., 2009; Koch et al., 2016). Second,
recurrent interactions between primary and higher visual
areas are correlated with the ability to report the presence
or absence of a stimulus in both humans and other animals
(e.g., Super et al., 2001; Haynes et al., 2005). Using a
multidisciplinary approach, Manita et al. (2015) demonstrate
that an interaction between somatosensory and recurrent motor
signals is essential for accurate perception in mice. In accord
with our hypotheses, apical synapses played a leading role
in this interaction. Third, psychophysical studies show that
masking prevents conscious perception of a target by interfering
with recurrent interactions and/or by directing facilitation to
the masking stimulus instead of to the target stimulus (e.g.,
Bachmann, 1994, 1997; Lamme et al., 2002; Del Cul et al., 2007;
Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2010). This evidence suggests that, even
when awake and attending, backward-masked stimuli can fail
to reach consciousness because the relevant feedforward signals
are masked before the recurrent feedback has time to affect
processing at the lower levels (e.g., Bachmann, 1994, 1997, 2012;
Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000; Lamme, 2004; Bachmann and
Hudetz, 2014). Fourth, the sequence from normal consciousness
to the minimally conscious state, the vegetative state, and coma
is strongly associated with decreasing amounts of recurrent
interaction (e.g., Bekinschtein et al., 2009; Vanhaudenhuyse
et al., 2010; see however Tzovara et al., 2015). Fifth, transcranial
magnetic stimulation (TMS) indicates that both the content and
the level of consciousness depend on these recurrent interactions
and the associated cortical effective connectivity and integration
(e.g., Pascual-Leone and Walsh, 2001; Jolij and Lamme, 2005;
Massimini et al., 2005; Murphy et al., 2016).
Apical function has been directly related to behavioral
evidence of perceptual awareness by Takahashi et al. (2016) They
found that, as predicted by the hypothesis of AA, overt detection
of small whisker deflections by awake mice is closely correlated
with calcium currents in the superficial layers. Great technical
difficulties are involved in directly assessing apical function in
awake behaving animals, however, so such direct evidence for an
association between apical function and perceptual awareness is
as yet rare.
A more plentiful source of evidence relating apical function
to conscious state concerns the effects of adrenergic arousal,
because that plays a leading role in regulating conscious state, and
affects apical function partly via its effects on Ih (see Phillips et al.,
2016 for an in-depth review). In brief, when adrenergic levels
and arousal are minimized, as in slow wave sleep for example,
consciousness is absent or minimal, and apical contributions to
pyramidal cell spiking are also minimal because high levels of the
leak current Ih tend to isolate apical sites from the soma. Thus, in
such states, consciousness and amplification of selected signals
are both minimal. Adrenergic input is stronger when awake,
however, and this enables the amplification of selected signals
partly because it enhances communication between apical sites
and the soma. Adrenergic arousal affects apical sites in particular
because norepinephrine varicosities and HCN channels are both
most dense in the superficial cortical layers, and NE tends to
reduce Ih (e.g., Audet et al., 1988; Lörincz et al., 2002; Wang
et al., 2007; Agster et al., 2013). Furthermore, in the awake
state, transient and sustained changes in arousal, attention,
and locomotion are highly correlated with noradrenergic and
cholinergic activity (McGinley et al., 2015). Thus, the degree of
alertness and the extent to which attention is focused involves
rapid modifications of neocortical activities by the noradrenergic
and cholinergic systems, which modify Ih and K+ currents in the
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apical dendrites of selected cells (Harnett et al., 2013, 2015). It
is well established that adrenergic arousal increases the effects
of prioritization on conscious perception, memory and learning
(Mather et al., 2016). The research reviewed by Mather et al.
(2016) and discussed by peers shows that prioritized stimuli and
their neighbors in space and time, ‘‘grab attention’’, with major
consequences for conscious cognition and action. AA provides
an intracellular mechanism by which such prioritization can be
achieved (Larkum and Phillips, 2016; Phillips et al., 2016). As
emotionally salient events are particularly likely to be prioritized
(Mather et al., 2016) this may help explain why the amygdala
projects directly to apical synapses (Amaral et al., 2003).
Higher-order thalamus, which provides much of the input
to apical synapses in layer 1, is often associated with perceptual
awareness, attention, and working memory. Many studies show
that its various regions regulate the strength with which
signals are transmitted between neocortical regions, but without
corrupting their information content (reviewed in Sherman,
2007, 2012, 2016; Nakajima and Halassa, 2017). This has been
most often shown in primary sensory regions of rodents, but
it has also been shown in PFC (e.g., Schmitt et al., 2017); and
in primates (e.g., Purushotaman et al., 2012; Komura et al.,
2013; Marion et al., 2013; Zhou et al., 2016). The crucial
contributions of higher-order thalamus to cortical information
processing have been studied in many ways. For example,
Zhou et al. (2016) found that pulvinar deactivation in rhesus
monkeys caused severe deficits in attentive modulation of and
behavioral responding to neocortical signals from the affected
parts of the visual field. This was combined with a localized
increase in low-frequency oscillations associated with inattention
or sleep, suggesting that interactions of each part of visual
cortex with an associated region in ventro-lateral pulvinar are
required to maintain that part of cortex in an active state
of attentive awareness. Komura et al. (2013) showed that in
monkeys higher-order thalamic activity is closely related to
the animal’s confidence when making perceptual decisions. A
perceptual categorization task was used to evaluate perceptually
experienced content, and an opt-out task was used to explore
the subjects’ confidence levels. They found that LGN activity was
correlated with the content of the behavioral decision, whereas
pulvinar activity was correlated with the monkey’s confidence
in that decision. All these findings support the fundamental
distinctions between signal strength and information content
in the neural domain, and between levels of consciousness and
semantic content in the subjective domain. They clearly indicate
that, though certain versions of the distinction between level and
content may be questionable (Bayne et al., 2016), some such
distinction is needed.
Apical function is implicated in the functions of higher-
order thalamus because it sends major projections to layer 1.
It is possible that the higher-order thalamic afferents to cortex
that are used to amplify those local cortical activities that are
currently relevant project to layer 1, whereas those that become
part of what the cell’s output transmits information about project
to lower layers. A simple but clear hint concerning the distal
dendritic locations of amplifying feedback signals is provided
by the LGN where descending afferents from layer 6 cells of
V1 project to the distal dendrites of the thalamic relay cells
(Sherman, 2012, 2016). In accordance with this theme of distal
locations for amplifying inputs, Rubio-Garrido et al. (2009)
show that a large number of higher-order thalamic afferents
converge on pyramidal cell distal dendrites in layer 1 throughout
sensory, association, and motor regions of rat neocortex. Some
of these higher-order thalamic afferents branch to innervate
large parts of the neocortex, whereas others arborize within
a single region (Collins et al., 2018; Halassa, 2018). Wimmer
et al. (2010) found that in rats the posteromedial nucleus of
the thalamus projects densely and specifically to layers 1 and
5A of vibrissal somatosensory cortex. Roth et al. (2016) find
that in mice a higher-order thalamic nucleus conveys diverse
contextual information to sensory cortex via layer 1. Another
body of evidence implicating apical synapses in the transmission
of amplifying higher-order thalamic information to cortex is
provided by studies of the bush baby, a small nocturnal primate.
Purushotaman et al. (2012) show that activating neurons in
the lateral pulvinar of bush babies can strongly boost the
responses of cells in corresponding regions of V1 to their direct
input from LGN while suppressing responses to surrounding
regions. They also found that reversible inactivation of the
lateral pulvinar cells prevented V1 cells transmitting their
visual information beyond V1, such that the animals gave no
behavioral signs of being aware of the suppressed stimuli. These
higher-order thalamic effects on signal strength are likely to
be mediated predominantly via apical synapses because Marion
et al. (2013) found that in bush babies the lateral pulvinar
projects densely to layer 1 of V1 but to no other layers in that
region.
Functional neuroimaging and perturbational methods for
assessing the complexity of cortical activity provide further
evidence that long-range interactions, which typically send large
projections to apical synapses, are crucial to the dynamics of
conscious states (e.g., Långsjö et al., 2012; MacDonald et al.,
2015; Casarotto et al., 2016). High-resolution 7-Tesla fMRI also
provides supportive evidence by showing that in awake humans
the superficial layers of early sensory cortex receive diverse
contextual inputs (e.g., Muckli et al., 2015; Petro and Muckli,
2017; Petro et al., 2017).
Computational modeling shows explicitly that, as we have
assumed, noradrenergic input to the neocortex from the locus
coeruleus can selectively enhance or attenuate cortical responses
(Safaai et al., 2015; Todd and Manaligod, 2018). Furthermore,
there have been several studies of computational capabilities that
arise from neurons with an apical compartment that can either
amplify or attenuate response to basal inputs. Reviews of these
computational studies show that all of the capabilities modeled
either require consciousness or elevate selected activities into
consciousness (Phillips et al., 2015; Phillips, 2017).
Several psychopathologies provide further grounds for
relating apical function to disorders of consciousness. Impaired
apical function may be involved in psychotic reductions in
context-sensitivity (Phillips and Silverstein, 2003, 2013). This will
be discussed in more detail below in relation to schizophrenia
and the effects of ketamine on NMDA receptors. Though there
are likely to be several other relevant disorders, there is space
Frontiers in Neural Circuits | www.frontiersin.org 6 July 2018 | Volume 12 | Article 50
Phillips et al. General Anesthesia and Apical Function
here to mention only one other example. It has been shown
that a rapid decline in expression of HCN1 channels and Ih
precedes the onset of seizures in a genetic rat model of absence
epilepsy (Kole et al., 2007). This loss of HCN1 occurred mainly
in the apical dendrites of layer 5 pyramidal neurons in the
cortex. Dual whole-cell recordings by Kole et al showed that this
increased somato-dendritic coupling and significantly reduced
the threshold for generation of dendritic calcium spikes by
backpropagating action potentials. Thus, this provides a somato-
dendritic mechanism for increasing the general non-selective
AA and synchronization of cortical output, which could play
an important role in the generation of absence seizures.
Absence seizures due to a general increase in this somato-
dendritic coupling is yet further evidence that it is not AA
per se that is associated with conscious states, but selective
amplification.
Finally in this list of grounds for relating apical function to
conscious state, we note that some philosophers have argued
that apical function could provide a mechanism by which
semantic contents can become conscious given that they have
been computed by other processes (Marvan and Polák, 2017).
This is of importance because it implies that, contrary to a
common philosophical assumption, production of the semantic
contents of a phenomenal quality and it’s becoming conscious
are not one and the same thing. From the perspective of the
dual model of consciousness advocated by Marvan and Polák
(2017), production of phenomenal qualities can be associated
with the feedforward processing that is mediated predominantly
by basal dendrites, whereas consciousness is associated with the
apical influences. As this is assumed to occur within a recurrent
hierarchy of abstractions, changes to the salience of signals
at any one hierarchical level will have major implications for
the processing of feedforward signals at others, and thus for
consciously experienced semantic content as a whole.
Putative relations between conscious state, adrenergic arousal,
Ih, and apical function that we infer from these findings and
arguments are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1 shows that apical depolarization may be amplifying
under some conditions and driving under others. There it is
assumed that if HCN channels are fully closed such that Ih is
at a minimum then apical inputs can become part of the drive
that pyramidal cells receive. This has been shown directly by
Atkinson andWilliams (2009) using HCN antagonists combined
with apical current injection. We hypothesize that this can occur
when humans are stressed because behavior reverts to reflexive
habitual responding unconstrained by its appropriateness to
current circumstances when high levels of glucocorticoid stress
hormones and adrenergic arousal are combined (Schwabe et al.,
2012; reviewed in Arnsten, 2015). Other evidence that apical
inputs can be driving under special circumstances comes from
the studies relating apical function to the detection of small
deflections of a whisker by mice (Takahashi et al., 2016). They
found high false alarm rates in some conditions, which implies
that responses usually dependent upon the actual occurrence of a
deflection also sometimes occurred when there was no deflection.
This suggests that, at some point in the neural pathway leading
to behavior, context that normally serves to facilitate detection
TABLE 1 | A summary of hypothesized relations between brain state,
norepinephrine levels (NE), HCN currents (Ih), and apical dendritic function.
State NE level Ih Apical function
Asleep Low High Isolated from soma
Awake Moderate Moderate Selective amplification
Attentive High Low Inc. Selectivity & Amplif.
High arousal Maximum Minimum Selective drive
e.g., Stereotypical impulses
Anesthetized
Ketamine propofol
Isoflurane
Low Minimum Non-selective slow waves
Though the distinction between consciousness and unconsciousness may be
regarded as categorical, we assume that the distinction between different waking
and attentive states is neither categorical nor mutually exclusive, being reflected in
variations of both the level of arousal and the semantic contents of consciousness.
A moderate level of selective amplification is hypothesized to provide the field
of consciousness when awake, with amplification being greater at the focus of
attention. Many other differences between the states listed, such as those in
cholinergic and other neuromodulatory systems, are not shown. Evidence that
selectivity of prioritization increases with arousal level is reviewed and assessed by
peers in Mather et al. (2016) (“Inc.” refers to “increase.” “Stereotypical impulses”
are those leading to reflexive, habitual, or impulsive responses unconstrained by
their appropriateness to current circumstances, and which become more probable
when stress is high. “Non-selective slow waves” include the synchronised activity
of very many cells such as those often observed during slow-wave sleep or
anesthesia).
of an actual deflection of the whisker can become driving and
produce a ‘‘detection’’ response by itself. Table 1 implies that
this is more likely to happen under conditions of high arousal,
and that this is in part mediated by adrenergic suppression of Ih.
All these inferences are testable, thus opening the door to many
theoretically motivated empirical investigations. For example,
the studies of Atkinson and Williams (2009) were performed
in vitro, so our assumption that their findings are relevant
needs to be tested. Another inference to be tested concerns false
alarms, such as those observed by Takahashi et al. (2016). If, as
hypothesized in Table 1, false alarms are due to an Ih-dependent
increase in apical drive when stress is high, then false alarms
should increase with stress in a way that is reduced by adrenergic
antagonists. Finally, it must be tempting to investigate whether
the proneness to hallucinatory experiences produced by inter-
stimulus conditioning (Powers et al., 2017) is also related to
AA or to effects on the strength of driving feedforward synaptic
connections.
EVIDENCE THAT GENERAL ANESTHETICS
INTERFERE WITH APICAL FUNCTION
Apical function can be related to general anesthesia on several
grounds. Anesthetic-induced unconsciousness occurs at doses
lower than that required to block feedforward transmission to
sensory cortex, and is associated with selective loss of modulatory
feedback (e.g., Lamme et al., 1998; Alkire et al., 2008), which
is predominantly mediated by apical synapses. Evidence that
general anesthetics can reduce dendritic spine density within tens
of minutes (Colon et al., 2017) also suggests a link to apical
synapses.
Mechanisms by which different anesthetics can interfere
with apical function in different ways are reviewed by Meyer
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(2015) and depicted in Figure 3. Here we simply summarize his
conclusions.
Meyer (2015) distinguished four ways in which general
anesthetics could interfere with apical function, with many
of them interfering in more than one way. First, they could
suppress the generation of calcium action potentials by the AIZ
(Figure 3A). Anesthetics identified as having this effect include
isoflurane, urethane, and pentobarbital. Second, they could
suppress regenerative N-methyl-d-aspartate (NMDA) potentials
that carry signals from peripheral tuft dendrites toward the AIZ
(Figure 3B). Anesthetics identified as having this effect include
ketamine and nitrous oxide. Third, anesthetics can up-regulate
inhibitory interneurons that, in turn, suppress the generation
of dendritic calcium action potentials (Figure 3C). Anesthetics
identified as having this effect include propofol and barbiturates.
Fourth, anesthetics can block the hyperpolarization-activated
current Ih, which is the leak conductance that uncouples somatic
and dendritic compartments under normal conditions. When
Ih is blocked, somatic activation alone may trigger a dendritic
calcium spike and thus a burst of somatic action potentials,
leading to a breakdown of the mechanism by which only
a few selected outputs are amplified while many others are
suppressed (Figure 3D). Anesthetics identified as having this
effect include ketamine, isoflurane, propofol, halothane and
pentobarbital.
On the basis of this evidence Meyer (2015) concluded
that higher-order thalamocortical projections and corticocortical
top-down projections have key roles in conscious perception,
and share two properties: (1) their activity is decreased under
general anesthesia; and (2) they both terminate primarily in
the superficial neocortical layers that contain apical dendrites.
Meyer (2015) interpreted evidence for a close association
between general anesthesia and apical function in terms of
predictive coding theory. The evidence for close associations
between consciousness, anesthesia and apical function is clear
by itself, however, and does not depend upon the validity of
any form of predictive coding theory. In particular, we do
not see anything in the evidence that either he or we have
reviewed that implies that feedforward driving signals code
for the difference between feedforward and feedback signals,
i.e., ‘‘prediction errors’’.
Thus, bottom-up pathways from subcortical
neuromodulators that regulate levels of general arousal and
top-down pathways that amplify specific contents could
both do so via effects on apical function. Anesthetics that
Mashour and Hudetz (2017) describe as primarily affecting
the level of consciousness, such as dexmedetomidine, could
FIGURE 3 | Four ways (A–D) in which anesthetics can interfere with apical function in neocortical pyramidal cells (from Meyer, 2015, with permission from Elsevier).
The blue oval is the AIZ. The black oval is the somatic integration zone that generates action potentials. See the main text for further explanation and examples of
anesthetics that affect each of the four mechanisms. GABA, γ-aminobutyric acid; NMDA, N-methyl-d-aspartate; Na+, sodium channels; Ca2+, calcium channels.
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in part do so by affecting the inputs to apical dendrites
from subcortical mechanisms that regulate the general level
of arousal. Anesthetics that Mashour and Hudetz (2017)
describe as primarily affecting the contents of consciousness,
such as ketamine, could do so predominantly by impairing
selective amplification of relevant signals by thalamocortical
inputs to apical dendrites. If only a limited subset of neurons
selectively signaling some sensory features is active at the
subthreshold level, then widespread (non-selective) modulation
arriving at the apical dendrites can effectively single-out
only that small subset (Bachmann, 1994, 2014; Larkum and
Phillips, 2016; Phillips et al., 2016). Thus, the effects of general
subcortical arousal and local intracortical amplification are
interdependent. The intracortical interactions specify what
to prioritize and subcortical arousal regulates the extent to
which prioritized signals are amplified (Mather et al., 2016).
Therefore it is likely that all or most anesthetics will to some
extent affect both the level of consciousness and its semantic
contents.
Put simply, these observations suggest that to be conscious
is to have particular explicitly reportable percepts, thoughts,
feelings and intentions, and that general anesthetics affect this by
interfering with the intracellular processes by which particular
activities are selectively amplified when relevant to the current
context.
HOW CAN BOTH INCREASES AND
DECREASES OF IH LEAD TO A LOSS OF
CONSCIOUSNESS?
Many fascinating issues arise concerning relations between
anesthesia, adrenergic arousal, slow-wave sleep, and REM sleep.
We do not have space to comment on all of them here, but we do
discuss one issue that may puzzle some readers. This concerns
the apparent contradiction between findings indicating that
consciousness is lost both when Ih is high, as in sleep, and when
it is blocked by ketamine, propofol, and isoflurane (Chen et al.,
2005, 2009; Zhou et al., 2013). This apparent contradiction can be
resolved in various ways. For example, one plausible explanation
is that the opening of background ‘‘leak’’ potassium channels
by general anesthetics may suppress any apical contributions
to action potential generation in spite of a parallel reduction
in Ih. Another possibility is that by so strongly suppressing Ih
in all pyramidal neurons, anesthetics may reduce the extent to
which particular neuronal responses can be selectively amplified.
This is in accord with findings indicating that heterogeneity
of single-cell responses within larger ensembles provides a
more accurate neural correlate of detection and/or perception
than the overall mean level of response (Tononi et al., 2016;
Storm et al., 2017). It is also in accord with the non-selective
loss of Ih through HCN1 channels that is associated with
absence seizures in a rat model of epilepsy (Kole et al., 2007).
Finally, this emphasis upon the increased heterogeneity of signals
strengths due to selective amplification is in agreement with
evidence that general anesthetics enhance global synchronization
similar to that observed in slow-wave sleep, thus reducing
the differentiation and complexity of cortico-thalamic activity
(Tononi et al., 2016).
THE ATYPICAL EFFECTS OF KETAMINE
PROVIDE FURTHER EVIDENCE THAT
STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS DEPEND
ON APICAL FUNCTION
Mashour and Hudetz (2017) emphasize the atypical effects
of ketamine. In contrast to other general anesthetics it
suppresses ventrolateral preoptic nucleus (VLPO), does not
depend upon increasing GABAergic inhibition, activates arousal-
promoting nuclei, depends on norepinephrine for its hypnotic
action, increases cortical acetylcholine levels, and preserves
electrophysiological and other signs of wakefulness (Mashour,
2014). Nevertheless, despite some preserved functions, the
contents of the dissociated state of consciousness induced by
sub-anesthetic doses of ketamine are disorganized, disconnected,
and incoherent (Collier, 1972). Instead of predominantly
reflecting the environment, the bizarre imagery experienced
in response to ketamine has internal origins. Overall, this fits
well with evidence that ketamine affects neural activity and
conscious content via its effects on NMDA receptors (Phillips
and Silverstein, 2003, 2013). This also fits well with apical
function because AA is highly dependent upon the regenerative,
voltage-dependent activation of NMDA receptor channels in
the form of NMDA-spikes (Larkum et al., 2009; Palmer et al.,
2014). Furthermore, although ketamine has effects that contrast
with those of other anesthetics, it, like them, has large effects
on apical spiking both in vitro and in vivo (Potez and Larkum,
2008).
One advantage of this perspective on NMDA function is
that it suggests how psychotic experiences in schizophrenia can
arise from reduced current through NMDA receptor channels.
The close association between psychosis and reduced NMDA
currents is well established (Phillips and Silverstein, 2003;
Moghaddam and Javitt, 2012), but it has long been difficult
to explain how that could have such specific effects given that
NMDA and AMPA receptors are usually co-localized. This
puzzle can now be resolved by noting that apical contributions
to action potential generation require NMDA spikes, whereas
basal contributions do not (Palmer et al., 2014). It has been
found that ketamine impairs the ability to form coherent percepts
(e.g., Uhlhaas et al., 2007), as does schizophrenia (Phillips
and Silverstein, 2003). Given that apical input has modulatory
functions, we can now propose an explanation of how it is that
at sub-anesthetic doses ketamine selectively impairs the ability
to use context to form coherent thoughts and percepts. First,
note that neural activity can be driven by internal knowledge
and thoughts, as well as by external input. If that internal
drive operates via basal dendrites then input from other parts
of the system to the apical tuft could function to ensure that
the internally generated activity as a whole is coherent. If the
effects of input to the apical tuft are impaired by a ketamine-
induced reduction of NMDA currents then memories and
thoughts will be less coherent, as hypothesized by Phillips and
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Silverstein (2003), and being less amplified will be less likely to
be transmitted to other cortical regions.
THESE ISSUES MAY BE CLARIFIED BY
RECENT ADVANCES IN INFORMATION
THEORY
A well-known conceptual framework that has been used to
address the issue of the neural bases of variations in conscious
state and relate them to anesthesia is that of integrated
information theory (IIT) (e.g., Hill and Tononi, 2005; Alkire
et al., 2008; Oizumi et al., 2014; Sarasso et al., 2015; Tononi
et al., 2016). Though that theory makes no explicit reference to
subcellular mechanisms such as apical function, a similar theory
does, i.e., the theory of coherent infomax (Phillips et al., 1995,
2015; Kay and Phillips, 2011; Kay et al., 1998; Phillips et al.,
2016). From the IIT perspective, anesthetics have been described
as hyperpolarizing neurons by increasing inhibition, increasing
intrinsic potassium conductance, and/or by decreasing excitation
(Alkire et al., 2008). The coherent infomax perspective implies
that, in addition to any such effects, anesthetics may also
operate by selectively increasing attenuation and/or decreasing
amplification via intracellular andmicrocircuit mechanisms such
as those reviewed above.
Information theory and the distinction between
‘‘modulatory’’ and ‘‘driving’’ interactions are central to both
IIT and the theory of coherent infomax. It has until recently
been difficult to provide a rigorous formalization of the notion
of modulation, however, because that requires an adequate
analysis of multivariate mutual information. Although it will
come as a surprise to many, mutual information in classical
Shannon information theory was formulated only for the case
of a single input vector and a single output vector. Multivariate
mutual information is not well defined in that theory. Shannon
tried to generalize the theory to encompass multi-variate
mutual information, but did not succeed. This situation is
changing rapidly, however, and several ways of partitioning
multivariate mutual information have now been proposed
(e.g., Williams and Beer, 2010; Harder et al., 2013; Bertschinger
et al., 2014; Griffith and Koch, 2014; Ince, 2017), and a Special
Issue of the journal Entropy (2018) has been devoted to them
(Information Decomposition of Target Effects from Multi-
Source Interactions). These advances have been used to provide
rigorous conceptual and analytic tools for specifying neural
goal functions (Wibral et al., 2017), and for distinguishing
between modulatory and driving interactions (Kay et al., 2017;
Kay and Phillips, 2018). These conceptual and analytic tools
have not yet been used to study general anesthesia, but the
hypotheses outlined here predict that when they are, they will
provide further evidence that conscious state and anesthesia
involve selective contextual modulation operating via apical
dendrites.
UNRESOLVED ISSUES AND DIFFICULTIES
Several testable predictions have been noted above, but other
many unresolved issues and difficulties arise. BAC-firing, AA,
and the effects of adrenergic arousal, as outlined above, have
so far been observed only in mammalian neocortex. Thus, if
consciousness in general were to be identified with system-
level properties that require such structures and processes
it may well turn out to have the implausible implication
that only mammals are conscious. Furthermore, though the
weight of evidence and opinion gives neocortex a central role
in the NCC in humans, it has been argued that, even in
humans, consciousness is possible without a neocortex (Merker,
2007). Merker (2013) argues that even in the presence of
a neocortex the neuronal basis of phenomenological sensory
content may be more accurately located in higher-order thalamic
regions, such as the dorsal pulvinar, than in neocortex. In
contrast to that, we have assumed that in humans it is
located in thalamocortical activities as a whole. It is not yet
clear whether and how such issues can be resolved. One
hypothetical possibility is that higher order thalamus acts as
a substrate for ‘‘primitive consciousness,’’ with its contents
also being ‘‘primitive’’. Another difficulty is that the HCN
channels that we have hypothesized to mediate the effects of
adrenergic arousal on apical function and mental state are
absent in neonates and develop slowly over a long time-span
(Atkinson and Williams, 2009). Our hypotheses therefore seem
to imply developmental changes of mental state that are so
fundamental that many may find them disconcerting, as to
some extent do we. One way to deal with difficulties that seem
to implausibly restrict the range of states considered to be
conscious may be to put more emphasis upon the diversity of
conscious states rather that on what they all have in common, if
anything. This raises many untested predictions and unresolved
issues. Can the use of context-sensitive abilities to selectively
amplify or strengthen relevant activities be implemented in ways
other than that in mammalian neocortex, and if so how do
constraints on those various ways differ? Do uniquely human
mental states arise from the evolution of enhanced intracellular
capabilities for dynamically deciding what to amplify? If so, to
what extent does that explain cognitive capabilities unique to
humans?
Difficulties and unresolved issues are clearly raised by
considering dreams from the perspective of the hypotheses
outlined in this article. Table 1 shows that apical inputs are
isolated from the soma by high Ih when levels of noradrenaline
are low, as they are during sleep. Noradrenaline levels are
low during REM sleep (Hobson et al., 1975; Aston-Jones
and Bloom, 1981; Rasmussen et al., 1986; Takahashi et al.,
2010), however; so, if conscious state depends upon apical
function, this seems to suggest that dreams may not be
conscious while being dreamt, but only become conscious
when remembered on awaking. Some people affirm that to
be consistent with their own phenomenology, and Marvan
and Polák (2017) could classify dreams as an example of
content without consciousness in support of their dual coding
theory. That theory contradicts the common identification of
consciousness with content that is phenomenally experienced,
however, and many people believe that they are conscious
of their dreams while having them. These issues concerning
consciousness may not be well posed, however. As there are
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clear differences between all three states on what grounds
can dream states be grouped with waking rather than
with slow-wave sleep? Consider dreams during anesthesia
(e.g., Brandner et al., 1997; Eer et al., 2009). A fruitful way
forward may therefore be to focus on clarifying the fundamental
similarities and differences between various mental states while
leaving open the question as to whether they can all be adequately
categorized as being either conscious or non-conscious. Here the
concept of levels of consciousness may again be useful because
the phenomenology of dreamt content is often vague, faint,
fragmented, unstable and lacking in deliberate control by the
dreamer.
Many other issues concerning the dependence of anesthetic
effects on subject and mental state arise. How can the effects of
anesthetics emphasized above be distinguished from their effects
on the cholinergic, dopaminergic, and seretonergic systems?
Are their effects on non-mammalian species compatible with
the hypotheses proposed above? Do their effects change with
development from infancy as would be expected given that
some of the effects of some of the anesthetics are mediated
by HCN channels that are not present at birth and develop
slowly? How are the effects of ketamine on Ih, and thus on
apical function, related to the transition from subanesthetic to
anesthetic doses? Are subanesthetic dissociative states induced
by ketamine explicable as effects on the contents rather than
on the level of consciousness? Are there uniquely human effects
of ketamine, as suggested by its psychotomimetic effects and
the doubts that many psychiatrists and others have concerning
the validity of animal models of psychoses? If anesthesia is
interpreted as blocking the amplifying effects of context that
we have related to consciousness, then how can they be
observed in animals under anesthesia, as they have been (e.g.,
Purushotaman et al., 2012; Palmer et al., 2014)? Though the
discoveries of Labarrera et al. (2018) indicate that the regulation
of AA via the effect of norepinephrine on Ih can be observed
under isoflurane anesthesia as well as during waking it is not
yet clear to us why the anesthesia did not suppress those
effects.
Finally, many questions arise concerning the distinction
between driving and modulatory interactions, such as
amplification and attenuation, and the relation of that to
the distinction between feedforward and feedback signals. Much
evidence for a distinction between driving and modulatory
effects of glutamate at the cellular level has been provided
by studies of Class 1 monosynaptic inputs, which have
many properties expected of drivers, and Class 2 inputs,
which many properties expected of modulators (Sherman,
2007, 2012, 2016). In the above we have assumed that
feedforward signals are driving and that feedback signals
are modulatory, as do many others. The evidence reviewed
by Sherman clearly contradicts that assumption, however,
because categorizing synaptic connections as Class 1 or 2 clearly
indicates that feedforward modulation and feedback drive are
also common (e.g., Covic and Sherman, 2011; De Pasquale
and Sherman, 2011). Several fundamental questions arise.
What is the relation between the class of synaptic interactions
and the morphological site of the synapses? This is as yet
unknown. An obvious default assumption is that Class 1 is
predominantly basal and Class 2 is predominantly apical,
but it is not known whether that is so or not. Although
we doubt that things are so simple, it may be that the
descending connections to deeper layers provide driving
connections via basal dendrites while those in layer 1 provide
modulatory influences via apical synapses. Do driving feedback
connections that descend the neocortical hierarchy serve
short-term memory and the creative imagination? Does
driving feedback project to the same cells as those transmitting
feedforward drive, and, if so, how can the cells to which they
project disambiguate the signals that they receive? Does the
prevalence of descending Class 1 driving connections support
the counter-stream theory that already has anatomical and
computational support (Ullman, 1995)? Could the presence
of descending drive in the absence of adequate contextual
modulation explain why dreams and delusions are so often
incoherent?
Many more doubts and questions concerning these issues and
hypotheses could be raised. It is not the aim of this article to
dispel the doubts or to answer all the questions; it is to show that
they merit far wider consideration.
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